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Using  a  panel  of  new  firms  and  their  employees,  this  paper  studies  the  promotion 
opportunities for older workers within the same firm. Survival analysis suggests that younger 
employees experience shorter times to promotion than older workers and, therefore, the latter 
face a smaller likelihood of promotion. Although men are promoted more often than women, 
empirical results show that women have shorter survival times to promotion than men. Also, 
previous promotions are stronger determinants of subsequent ones and this finding provides 
support to the evidence on promotion “fast-tracks”. 
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1  Introduction 
As a response to the challenge of population aging, increasing employment rates of 
older individuals and delaying their exit from the labor force are the core objectives of 
active aging policies. As the demographic prevalence of older cohorts grows, so does their 
relevance in the labor force. 
Older  workers  have  been  the  major  contributors  to  employment  growth  in  the 
European  Union  (EU)
1.  Nevertheless,  older  individuals  still  face  difficulties  in  what 
concerns employment
2 and career development opportunities such as promotion. Adams 
(2002) studies the effect of age discrimination in promotion on wage growth, separations 
and early retirement, and finds that in firms where older individuals report that younger 
workers are favored in promotions, older workers face lower wage growth and a greater 
likelihood  of  early  retirement.  Data  used  are  based  on  reported  perceptions  by  older 
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individuals of their firms’ promotion practices. Johnson and Neumark (1997) also suggest 
that age discrimination is associated with a higher likelihood of job separation together with 
a smaller propensity to remain employed. Thus, age differences in promotion prospects 
have practical consequences on the labor force status of older individuals, influencing their 
retirement decision. 
Since age appears to be a disadvantage factor in what labor market opportunities is 
concerned, this research aims to examine if there are any differences in career development 
between  younger  individuals  and  older  ones.  This  is  done  employing  survival  analysis 
techniques on a sample of new firms and their workers. 
We take advantage of a comprehensive data set called Quadros de Pessoal (QP). QP is a 
matched employer-employee longitudinal database that, given the mandatory nature of the 
underlying  survey,  covers  the  population  of  firms  and  workers  in  the  private  sector. 
Contrary to other data sets (such as the ones used by McCue (1996), Pergamit and Veum 
(1999), Francesconi (2001)), the promotion events are not self-reported but are supplied by 
the firm. This allows for the definition of a benchmark, at least within firms, that reduces 
measurement errors associated with self-reported data. 
Quadros de Pessoal has formerly been used to study the determinants of promotions in 
the Portuguese labor market. Lima and Pereira (2003) focus on workers’ career and wages 
using a sample of large firms, highlighting the effect of promotions on wage growth, while 
Lima and Centeno (2003) study the careers of top managers. However, since both these 
studies centre the attention on particular groups (the former in large firms and the latter in 
top managers) results cannot be generalized. Lima (2004), Silva and van der Klaauw (2006), 
and Ferreira (2009) produce a set of results that can be generalized. Yet, none of these 
studies focuses on the promotion opportunities faced by older individuals. 
Do  older  workers  experience  the  same  likelihood  of  promotion  as  younger  ones? 
Considering a sample of new firms, our findings suggest that this is not the case: older 
employees are in fact in disadvantage when it comes to promotion opportunities. 
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  a  theoretical  synopsis  on 
employment relationships and career development. The following section displays previous 
empirical results on the determinants of promotions. A description of the data set used is 
presented in Section 4. This section also highlights the survival time characteristic of the 
data.  Section  5  describes  and  discusses  the  estimation  procedures  used  and  Section  6 
reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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2  Theoretical overview 
The study of employment relationships in labor economics has grown in relevance over 
the last decades. Unequivocal is the statement that long-term employment relationships 
benefit both employers and workers. These benefits are highlighted, among other authors, 
by Oi (1962) and Lazear (1979, 1981). As job tenure increases, the employer becomes 
aware of the quality of the worker, measured by his productivity, and both recognize or not 
the quality of the match (Jovanovic, 1979). A mismatch leads to job separation while good 
matches may lead the worker through a defined career path within the firm’s hierarchy. The 
concept of a career is the basic feature of an internal labor market where careers are seen as 
a sequence of promotions to higher hierarchical levels with higher pay and responsibility 
(Baker et al., 1994a). Firms implement internal labor markets in which careers and wages 
are somewhat protected from external labor markets (Baker and Holmstrom, 1995) as a 
means to motivate workers and, thus, enhance their productivity. 
Gibbons  (1996)  provides  an  interesting  review  on  the  theory  of  wages  and  career 
dynamics within firms. The author mentions four underlying literatures: job assignment, 
tournaments, human capital and learning. 
The  job  assignment  literature  (Sattinger,  1975;  Rosen,  1982  and  Waldman,  1984a) 
focuses on the assignment of workers to jobs when firms consist of an array of potential 
job assignments and there exists full information about workers and jobs. The models are 
static and based on the idea that employees with higher ability should be assigned to jobs 
where  decisions  have  an  impact  over  a  larger  scale  of  operations.  However,  since  the 
models are static, they cannot explain wage and career dynamics (Gibbons and Waldman, 
1999;  2006).  Nevertheless,  when  the  firm  assigns  the  worker  to  a  new  job  it  signals 
information to competing firms about the worker’s ability (Waldman, 1984b; Bernhardt 
and  Scoones,  1993).  Therefore,  the  wage  increase  offered  to  the  employee  must  be 
sufficiently high to disincentive competition by other firms. 
Lazear
3 and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986) see promotions as a prize awarded the 
winner  of  a  competition.  They  develop  a  tournament  theory  based  on  a  rank-order 
payment  scheme  that  resembles  a  contest.  Workers  are  paid  a  prize  that  is  higher  for 
                                                 
3 Lazear’s (1979) theory of deferred compensation can also be seen as a worklife incentive scheme. This 
theory argues that senior workers receive wages above their marginal product to motivate them during the 
initial years of their careers (when wages are below their marginal product). Lazear (1999) relates worklife 
incentive  theory  to  tournament  theory  but,  while  tournaments  emphasize  relative  comparisons  between 
workers, worklife incentive schemes are not comparison-based. Also, tournaments highlight wage increases 
upon promotion, which correspond to job changes whereas worklife incentives focus on pay changes that 
occur within a job instead of the change between them. But, as Lazear (1999) states, both incentive designs 
can be at work within the same firm.  
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workers in upper positions within the firm: the  winner is the worker with the highest 
productivity. This type of incentives is particularly relevant when firms face substantial 
monitoring costs. Additionally, compensation schemes like rank-order tournaments seem 
to favor long-run employment relationships between employer and employee. However, 
there is a drawback associated with this category of incentive schemes: they may induce 
excess  competition  among  employees  and  damage  worker  cooperation.  Additionally, 
tournament theory does not take into consideration the possibility of external competition 
by other workers, for the same position. Chan (1996) compares the choice between internal 
promotion and external recruitment within the context of a tournament. He finds that 
when competition is open to external applicants, internal workers reduce their chance of 
promotion. But he also suggests that an external applicant is only hired whenever she/he is 
significantly better that the internal candidate. 
Manove (1997) concludes that firms can diminish incentive costs through the definition 
of  a  job  ladder  and  offering  promotion  prospects.  That  is,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
employer to construct an internal job ladder that induces workers in low paying jobs (hired 
externally) to offer increased effort as a way of paying for promotion (internal) to high 
paying jobs. 
Investments  in  human  capital  may  also  result  in  promotions  (Becker,  1962).  While 
general training (general human capital accumulation) raises the future marginal product of 
employees in the firm providing it, it would also increase the workers’ marginal product in 
many other firms. Because of this, the wage of trainees is below their actual marginal 
product, meaning that employees pay for their general on-the-job training. Conversely, the 
accumulation  of  firm-specific  human  capital,  through  specific  training,  increases 
productivity  more  in  firms  providing  it.  Therefore,  and  since  specific  training  involves 
investment by both firm and worker, they have an incentive to engage in a long-term 
employment relationship. Carmichael (1983) shows that when employers and employees 
invest in specific human capital, promotions are given to trained workers according to their 
seniority level. 
According to the learning literature, firms do not know about the worker’s ability when 
she/he enters the labor force but, as time goes by, the firm becomes aware of it. Therefore, 
as tenure in a job increases, the worker’s productivity is known more precisely (Jovanovic, 
1979) and good performances will be rewarded with higher wages. A promotion may well 
be the firm’s response after learning about the worker’s productivity.  
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Farber and Gibbons (1996) develop a dynamic model of learning and present it as a 
complement to the human capital model in the explanation of wage dynamics. 
Gibbons  and  Waldman  (1999)  show  that  a  model  that  combines  features  of  job 
assignment,  human  capital  acquisition  and  learning  can  capture  some  of  the  empirical 
findings  concerning  promotion  dynamics  and  wages  within  firms,  such  as  the  positive 
association between promotions and wage increases or that workers who get large wage 
increases at one particular job level are more likely to be promoted to the next level. 
 
3  Previous empirical findings 
Empirical studies on promotion and career dynamics inside firms do not focus on 
testing  any  of  the  above  mentioned  theories  in  particular.  Instead,  previous  research 
combines features of each of those theories to examine mobility within firms. 
Summarizing the empirical results it is possible to verify that promotion rates fall with 
age and experience. McCue (1996) finds that age and experience are negatively associated 
with the promotion likelihood, while Pergamit and Veum (1999) present evidence of the 
statistical non-significance of these variables. However, Adams (2002) shows that in firms 
where older employees report that younger workers are favored in promotions, the former 
face  lower  wage  growth  and  a  greater  likelihood  of  early  retirement.  Thus,  promotion 
practices that favor younger workers are negatively correlated with wage growth of older 
workers and positively correlated with the retirement decision. 
Tenure effects are less consistent, with evidence both for positive and negative effects. 
McCue (1996), Francesconi (2001) and Lima and Centeno (2003) have found that tenure 
and promotion probabilities have an inverse U-shaped relationship. Conversely, Abraham 
and  Medoff  (1985)  suggest  that  within-firm  mobility  declines  with  tenure.  Education 
effects are generally not significant (e.g. Pergamit and Veum, 1999), but when they are, 
promotion is positively associated with higher levels of education (McCue, 1996).  
There is evidence of both higher promotion opportunities for men than for women 
(Olson  and  Becker,  1983;  Pergamit  and  Veum,  1999)  and  of  equal  gender  promotion 
likelihood (Booth et al., 2003). Lazear and Rosen (1990) conclude that, since the ability 
standard for promotion is higher for women, more able women will be passed over for 
promotion by less able men. The fact that women face more non-market opportunities 
(such as household production) than men works as a penalty, lowering females’ promotion 
probabilities. According to Lazear and Rosen (1990), a higher expected value of home time  
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raises the probability of separation for women which, in turn, increases the levels of ability 
for promotion by female employees. 
Consistent with the “fast-tracks” mentioned by Baker et al. (1994a), there is evidence of 
a positive association between prior promotions and current promotions (Pergamit and 
Veum, 1999). Workers who have been previously promoted are more likely to be promoted 
once again. 
As for firm characteristics, Pergamit and Veum (1999) and Francesconi (2001) find that 
larger  firms  provide  better  promotion  prospects.  A  similar  conclusion  is  suggested  by 
Topel and Ward (1992) who argue that large firms comprise workers’ movements that 
would otherwise take place between smaller firms. In larger organizations, the existence of 
an internal labor market allows for career development within the firm, where individuals 
progress to higher level jobs through promotions (Baker et al., 1994a). 
Overall,  as  a  consequence  of  promotions  workers  are  rewarded  with  higher  wages 
(Topel  and  Ward,  1992;  Baker et  al.,  1994b;  McCue,  1996;  Pergamit  and  Veum,  1999; 
Francesconi, 2001). 
 
4  Data 
4.1 Quadros de Pessoal: a matched employer-employee data set  
We use data for the Portuguese economy from eighteen waves of Quadros de Pessoal, a 
matched worker-firm longitudinal data set. Annually, the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and 
Social  Solidarity  gathers  information  on  all  firms,  from  the  private  sector,  with  wage-
earners. Data collection is based on a mandatory response survey to firms. 
Quadros  de  Pessoal  includes  information  on  two  hundred  thousand  firms  a  year,  on 
average, and their workers (over two million a year). Each firm and worker is uniquely 
identified in the data set and this allows researchers to follow them over time. 
Firm  level  information  includes  the  date  of  creation,  number  of  establishments, 
number of workers, sales, industry, and region, among other. Workers’ files present data 
such as age, gender, date of admission into the firm, date of latest promotion, education, 
hierarchical level, occupation and wages. 
The information used in this study covers the 1986-2005 period, with the exceptions of 
1990 and 2001 since no worker data is reported for these years. After merging the cross-
sectional worker’s and firm’s files and after some cleaning of the data set (see Appendix  
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4.A for a detailed description), we obtain a sample with 1,033,767 observations, for 416,170 
workers, 44,920 firms and 437,498 matches firm-worker. 
The sample includes only new firms. This way, there is no past history of the worker 
within the firm that we cannot retrieve information about. However, with a sample of new 
firms, a problem may emerge: new firms experience high death rates. In effect, Mata and 
Portugal  (1994)  show  that  20%  of  the  firms  created  in  the  Portuguese  manufacturing 
industry in 1983 died during the first year and that only half survived for four years. Thus, 
we keep in the sample firms that survived for at least two years after their creation. Table 
B1 in Appendix B displays the distribution of these firms’ survival times. 
 
4.2 Promotion event data 
Allison (1984: 9) defines an event as “some qualitative change that occurs at a specific 
point in time”. In this research, the qualitative change under analysis is a promotion. To 
study the promotion event and its determinants, a collection of event history (or survival) 
data  is  needed.  Using  longitudinal  data  like Quadros  de  Pessoal  that  collects  the  date  of 
promotion for workers within their firms makes such a study viable. Unlike other studies, 
the dates of promotion and, therefore, the promotion events are not self-reported. They 
are provided by the firm, thus less sensitive to measurement errors.  
Since we use a sample of newly created firms, the worker’s career within the firm is 
observed until he/she gets a promotion, and thereafter. The promotion event is defined by 
the variable “date of the latest promotion”, which refers to the year and month of the 
promotion. Due to the format of the variable, time elapsed until promotion is measured in 
months. Using 20 years of data from Quadros de Pessoal, the time to event (or spell length) 
ranges from 0 to 238 months.
4 
Not only do we know how long it took a worker to get his/her first promotion, but we 
have also information concerning subsequent spells. This multiple spell data framework 
means that we can learn about the promotion history of the worker within the same firm. 
Nevertheless,  if  promotions  measure  the  success  of  an  employee  within  a  firm,  some 
workers fail to be successful. Effectively, for as long as data are available, some workers 
were not or have not yet been promoted (the spell end date is unknown), and so the total 
length  of  time  is  unknown.  These  right-censored  observations  are  also  taken  into 
consideration in the treatment of the data. Also, for workers with previous promotion 
                                                 
4 October is the month of collection for the 2005 survey, the last survey year considered.  
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events,  subsequent  spells  length  may  be  censored  if  the  follow-up  period  ends  before 
promotion. Table B2 in Appendix B summarizes the distribution of promotions among 
workers. 
For uncensored observations, the spell lengths until the first promotion were computed 
as  the  difference  between  the  date  of  the  first  promotion  received  and  the  date  of 
admission at the firm. Subsequent spells were defined through the difference between the 
date of the present promotion and the date of the previously reported promotion. 
For right-censored observations, distinction has to be made between those who have 
never experienced a promotion and those who have previous events. As for the former, the 
length of the uncompleted spell is given by the date of collection of the survey minus the 
date of admission at the firm, while for the latter that length is obtained by the difference 
between  the  date  of  collection  of  the  last  survey  and  the  date  of  the  last  reported 
promotion.  
The final structure of the data considers only one observation per worker and per 
event
5, since it does not include time varying covariates. Because of this, the sample used in 
the empirical setting contains 479,308 observations, including 91,214 promotion events 
(complete spells). The observations refer to 402,463 workers and 44,728 firms. Summary 
statistics of the all events are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of events 
Survival time  Spells  Frequency  Percent 
25%  50%  75% 
Completed  91,214  19.03  12  16  30 
Right-censored  388,094  80.97       
Total  479,308  100       
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: Survival time is measured in months. 
 
4.3 Promotions and workers’ characteristics 
Of the 91,214 promotion events considered, more than 70% were awarded to workers 
aged less than 35 years at hire while only 10% were given to older workers (with 45 or 
more years of age). The distribution of promotions by age group at hire is presented in 
Table 2 and it also displays gender differences in the distribution. One fact depicted in 
Table  2  is  that  men  obtained  more  than  half  of  the  promotions  and  this  distribution 
towards men increases with the age group at hire (see column (2)). Moreover, it shows that 
                                                 
5 For instance, a worker that did not receive any promotion during the observation period (right-censored 
observation) contributes with a single “censored” observation to the survival data. For a worker with multiple 
events, each event represents an observation, and it is assembled as pooled data.  
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older workers are promoted less often and this evidence is even stronger for older women 
(column (3)). 
 
Table 2: Distribution of promotion (%) by age group at hire and gender 


























Number of events 







Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: 479,308 observations. In parentheses, columns (2) and (3) show the gender distribution of promotions 
within age group at hire.  
 
The suspicion of fewer chances for promotion for older individuals is reinforced by the 
data in Table 3 where promotion rates are summarized. Promotion rates decrease with age 
for both men and women but, with the exception of the 55-75 age group, women have a 
higher incidence of promotions than men. For instance, almost 21% of the women in the 
25-34 age group at hire receive a promotion against 17% of the men. Higher promotion 
rates for women are also found in the data for Britain used by Booth et al. (2003). 
 
Table 3: Promotion rates by age group at hire and gender 






15-24  22.70  21.04  24.62 
25-34  18.78  17.29  20.71 
35-44  16.44  14.89  18.82 
45-54  15.18  14.63  16.23 
55-75  12.76  13.26  11.52 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. Columns (1) to (3) report percentages. 
 
Analysis of the duration data also reveals differences in the survival probability by age 
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival curves, by gender 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, in months. 
 
Survival  curves  by  gender,  presented  in  Figure  1,  show  that  women  face  shorter 
survival times than men, although data from Table 2, column (2), indicates that men get 
more promotions than women. 
Figure  2  plots  the  Kaplan-Meier  survival  curves  for  each  age  group,  showing  that 
younger workers are more likely to receive a promotion than those who are older.  
 
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survival curves, by age group at hire 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, in months. 
 
Figure 3 also displays the fact that those who are older are less likely to be promoted 
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier survival curves, by gender and age group at entry 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, in months. 
 
It is plausible to think that firms promote younger workers because older workers have 
been promoted earlier in their careers and are already at higher levels in the hierarchy. 
However, in this sample of new firms the hierarchical level of entry into the firm is known 
and in accordance with the previous statement, older workers should be overrepresented at 
higher hierarchical levels. Table 4 displays the age distribution of employees by hierarchical 
level at hire and shows that higher levels (such as top managers or other managers) are 
predominantly occupied by employees aged 25 to 34. 
 
Table 4: Age distribution (%) by hierarchical level at hire 



















workers  Apprenctices 
15-24  7.65  12.80  10.04  18.20  25.98  32.85  31.69  67.17 
25-34  48.82  47.38  36.59  50.40  38.95  34.69  30.04  22.53 
35-44  24.33  22.25  29.30  18.57  21.42  19.40  20.30  7.11 
45-54  13.60  12.51  17.23  9.36  10.29  9.82  12.25  2.50 
55-75  5.60  5.05  6.84  3.47  3.37  3.25  5.73  0.89 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. 
 
Additional  descriptive  statistics  of  selected  variables  is  presented  in  Table  5.  The 
sample comprises individuals mainly hired at younger ages where men account for more 
than half of the observations. Low educational levels is also a feature of the sample since, 
for almost 60% of the observations, 6 or less years of schooling is the highest attained level  
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of  education.  Workers  enter  the  firm  mainly  at  lower  levels  of  the  hierarchy  and,  on 
average, wait 27 months to be promoted. 
 
Table 5: Definition and summary statistics of selected variables 





Age  Age of the worker, in years  33.244 
(10.821)  -- 
Age group at hire  Age interval, at the time of hiring     
15-24  =1 if the worker aged 15 to 24, inclusive  --  32.06 
25-34  =1 if the worker aged 25 to 34, inclusive  --  35.71 
35-44  =1 if the worker aged 35 to 44, inclusive  --  19.09 
45-54  =1 if the worker aged 45 to 54, inclusive  --  9.66 
55-75  =1 if the worker aged 55 to 75, inclusive  --  3.49 
Gender  Gender     
Male  =1 if men  --  57.76 
Female  =1 if women  --  42.24 
Education  Higher attained educational level     
No schooling  =1 if the worker has not attended school  --  .42 
2 years  =1 if the worker has two complete years  --  .82 
4 years  =1 if the worker completed 4 years  --  29.86 
6 years  =1 if the worker completed 6 years  --  27.50 
9 years  =1 if the worker completed 9 years  --  18.71 
12 years  =1 if the worker graduated from high school  --  16.90 
15 years  =1 if the worker completed 15 of education  --  1.35 
16 years  =1 if the workers completed 16 or more years  --  4.42 
Hierarchical level at entry  Hierarchical level when the workers entered the firm     
Top managers  =1 if top managers  --  3.75 
Other managers  =1 if other managers  --  2.52 
Foremen/supervisors  =1 if foremen or supervisors  --  2.32 
Highly skilled personnel  =1 if highly skilled workers  --  3.99 
Skilled personnel  =1 if skilled workers  --  45.06 
Semi-skilled personnel  =1 if semi-skilled workers  --  14.03 
Unskilled personnel  =1 if unskilled workers  --  13.68 
Apprentices  =1 if apprentices  --  14.65 
Hierarchical level  Current hierarchical level     
Top managers  =1 if top managers  --  3.83 
Other managers  =1 if other managers  --  2.73 
Foremen/supervisors  =1 if foremen or supervisors  --  2.99 
Highly skilled personnel  =1 if highly skilled workers  --  4.46 
Skilled personnel  =1 if skilled workers  --  47.95 
Semi-skilled personnel  =1 if semi-skilled workers  --  14.77 
Unskilled personnel  =1 if unskilled workers  --  12.54 
Apprentices  =1 if apprentices  --  10.73 
Previous events  Number of prior promotions  .176 
(.586) 
-- 
Tenure (in months)  Tenure at the firm, in months  32.518 
(32.834) 
-- 
Time to event (in months)  Survival time to promotion, in months  26.944 
(27.829) 
-- 
Firm size (log of number of 
employees) 





Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: 479,308 observations. 
  
  13 
5  Parametric models for survival analysis 
5.1 Choosing a model 
Parametric models for event data may assume two forms: accelerate failure time (AFT) 
models or proportional hazard (PH) models.
6 
Consider t to be the survival time to an event. An AFT model starts by modelling ln t 
rather than t. In a log linear form, the regression model can be written as: 
u t + = β x
' ln  
where  x   is  a  vector  of  covariates,  β   is  the  vector  of  regression  coefficients,  and  u  
represents  the  error  term  with  a  probability  density  function  given  by  (.) f .  The 
distributional form of the error term  u  determines the AFT model (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005). If the function  (.) f  has normal density, then the above model is called a lognormal 
regression model. Alternatively, if  (.) f  is of logistic density, then a log-logistic regression 
model  is  in  order.  When  (.) f   is  an  extreme-value  density,  an  exponential  or  Weibull 
regression  models  are  obtained.  A  generalized  gamma  model  (that  assumes  a  gamma 
distribution), nesting the Weibull or lognormal models, is also a parametric possibility.
7  
AFT models change the time scale by a factor of  ( ) xβ − exp : if it is greater than 1, time 
is accelerated and if that factor is less than 1, time is decelerated. This means that if an 
individual  at  the  baseline  faces  a  probability  of  survival  past  time t  equal  to  ( ) t S ,  the 
survivor function, then an individual with covariates  x  would experience probability of 
survival  past  time  t  equal  to  ( ) t S   evaluated  at  the  point  ( )t xβ − exp .  This  implies  a 
deceleration  of  time  with  the  increase  of  a  covariate.  Under  AFT,  the  impact  of  the 
regressors is assumed to act additively on the log time scale and, thus, multiplicatively on 
the time scale itself. The parameters represent the effect of the covariates on the log time 
scale. 
AFT models measure the direct effect of the independent variables on the survival time 
instead of the hazard as in the PH models. This allows for an easier interpretation of the 
results because the parameters measure the effect of the correspondent covariate on the 
mean survival time. 
 
                                                 
6 A comparison between proportional hazards and accelerate failure time models is provided by Patel et al. 
(2006). 
7  The  generalized  gamma  distribution  has  two  ancillary  parameters:  sigma  and  kappa.  The  Weibull 
distribution is a special case of the generalized gamma when kappa equals 1. When kappa equals zero, it 
reflects the lognormal distribution.  
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In the PH model, the regressors have a multiplicative impact on the hazard function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) x g t h t h 0 =  
The function  ( ) t h0  may assume a parametric form, such as Weibull, exponential or 
Gompertz.  ( ) x g  is a non-negative function of regressors. The model includes an intercept 
term  0 β ,  and  since  letting  ( ) ( ) xβ x exp = g   is  a  common  option,  ( ) ( ) 0 0 t h β exp =   is  the 
baseline  hazard  function.  Thus,  the  baseline  hazard  function  is  the  hazard  when  all 
covariates are zero. That is, the intercept term can be used to scale the baseline hazard. 
Nevertheless, if the function  ( ) t h0  is not specified it yields the Cox proportional hazard 
model. The hazard of the event of interest in one group is a constant multiple of the hazard 
in the other group. In these models, the parameters represent the log hazard ratios which, 
exponentiated, provide the hazard ratios. 
Patel et al. (2006) underline that although the PH and AFT metrics are often thought of 
two distinct frameworks, they are connected since the exponential and the Weibull models 
can be implemented as both AFT and PH models. The authors additionally point out that 
the Weibull model often gives similar results to the more general PH model as for the 
effects  of  the  covariates  and,  so,  the  AFT  model  can  be  considered as  a  very  general 
approach that contains a specific class of PH models. 
Since there is an array of possible distributional forms and corresponding parametric 
models, how can selection be made? When parametric models are nested, likelihood-ratio 
or Wald tests may be used to choose between alternatives. This can be done to discriminate 
between Weibull versus exponential or between gamma versus lognormal or Weibull. 
Nonetheless,  when  nesting  is  not  evidenced,  likelihood-ratio  or  Wald  tests  are  not 
appropriate  and  an  alternative  statistic  has  to  be  used.  A  popular  one  is  the  Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). Considering this, even though the model that best fits the data 
is the one with the largest log-likelihood, the preferred model is the one with smallest AIC 
value.  
 
5.2 Models with frailty and shared frailty
8 
The above parametric models are able to explain the variability in observed time to 
failure. However, both observed and unobserved heterogeneity affect survival times. Due 
to  omitted  variables,  some  unexplained  variability  or  overdispersion  may  remain  and, 
hence, standard parametric survival models will not take into consideration why individuals 
                                                 
8 Gutierrez (2002), Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Stata (2007) provide a good explanation of these models.  
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with shorter times to failure are more frail than others. That is, controlling for observed 
heterogeneity, individuals with unobserved characteristics associated with shorter times to 
failure  leave  the  state  more  quickly  than  others;  in  the  presence  of  unobserved 
heterogeneity even subjects with the same values of all regressors may experience different 
hazards. In this case, the estimate of the hazard will be an underestimate of the ‘true’ one 
(see  Jenkins,  2004).  When  unobserved  heterogeneity  (also  called  ‘frailty’  in  survival 
literature) is not account for, its effect is confounded with the baseline hazard. 
A frailty model is a survival model with unobserved heterogeneity for it attempts to 
measure  that  overdispersion.  The  frailty  is  included,  in  each  row,  as  an  unobservable 
multiplicative effect, α , on the hazard function: 
( ) ( ) t h t h α α = |  
( ) t h  is a nonfrailty hazard function, α  is a random positive effect that, for identification, is 
assumed to have mean 1 and variance θ . 
Conditional on the frailty, the survivor function is now given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) [ ]
α α α α t S du
u S
u f











− =  

 
− = ∫ ∫ exp | exp |  
 
where  ( ) t S  is the survivor function corresponding to the hazard function  ( ) t h .  
Because  α  is unobservable, it has to be integrated out of the conditional survivor 
function  ( ) α | t S  in order to achieve the unconditional survivor function. Considering that 
the probability density function of  α  is given by  ( ) α g , a frailty model can be estimated 
following 




d g t S d g t S t S α α α α α
α
θ |  
 
The  unconditional  hazard  and  density  functions  can  be  obtained  from  the 
unconditional survivor function as  ( ) ( )










θ − = , respectively. 
Therefore,  compared  to  a  standard  parametric  model,  a  frailty  survival  model 
additionally estimates the parameter θ , which is an overdispersion parameter. 
For mathematical tractability, the choice of the frailty distribution  ( ) α g  rests on either 
the inverse-Gaussian distribution, with parameters 1 and 
θ
1 , or the gamma distribution 
with 
θ
1  and θ  as distributional parameters.   
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lim . This means that, when there 
is no unobservable heterogeneity, the frailty model reduces to  ( ) t S . 
Using  frailty  models,  distinction  has  to  be  made  between  the  hazard  faced  by  the 
individual,  ( ) t h α , and the hazard for the population,  ( ) t hθ . Correspondingly, an individual 
has  a  probability  of  survival  past  time  t  equal  to  ( ) [ ]
α t S ,  whilst  ( ) t Sθ   measures  the 
proportion of the population that survives past time t.
9 
A shared frailty model is a generalization of the frailty models, where the frailty is 
considered  to  be  group  specific.  Thus,  in  shared  frailty  models,  where  individuals  are 
allowed  to  share  the  same  frailty  value,  the  frailty  can  be  used  to  model  intragroup 
correlation. It is the equivalent to a random effects panel data model (Gutierrez, 2002).  
For each observation from the ith group, in a shared frailty model the hazard becomes 
( ) ( ) x | | t h t h i i α α =  
where  i α represents the frailty shared among group i and  ( ) x | t h  is the individual hazard 
given regressors x . 
Therefore, the subjects within a group are correlated since they share a common frailty. 
In this research we consider three possible “groups”: the worker, the firm, and the match 
worker-firm.  
Under an omitted variables scenario, a frailty model could be used when suspecting for 
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity within the group, while a shared frailty model 
could be specified in the presence of a latent common group effect. 
 
5.3 Occurrence dependence 
Dealing with multiple record/multiple events brings some concerns to the analysis. 
Specifically, it stresses the problem of event dependence. Hence, one assumption that has 
to be made is that the dependence of the hazard on time since last promotion has the same 
distributional form for each successive promotion. A second assumption required is that, 
for each individual, the multiple events must be independent. 
As  suggested  by  Allison  (1984),  the  consequences  of  violating  the  occurrence 
independence assumption can be minimized through the consideration, in the model, of 
                                                 
9 Using the Stata 11 command – streg – to fit parametric survival models, when specifying the option – 
distribution(  ) – a model for an individual with frailty equal to 1 will be specified; recall that when 
( ) [ ] ( ) t S t S = =
α α 1, . However, specifying – frailty(distribution) – determines which of the two above 
forms for  ( ) t Sθ   is used.  
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covariates that capture the workers’ previous promotion history. To do so, we include in 
the  specification  a  variable  that accounts  for  the number  of  prior  promotions:  Previous 
events.  Also,  the  length  of  the  previous  spell  is  set  to  zero  when  no  previous  spell  is 
observed. 
For comparison, we estimate duration models for the first promotion as well as models 
for all promotions. This is done in order to examine potential differences between the 
distributions of time to first promotion and of all events. 
 
6  Estimation results 
6.1 First promotion 
The effect of selected covariates on the hazard (PH models) and on the survival time to 
first promotion (AFT models) is, respectively, exhibited in Tables 6 and 7.
10 In the PH 
form,  each  regression  coefficient  indicates  the  proportional  effect  on  the  hazard  of 
absolute changes in the respective covariate. Thus, a negative coefficient reflects a smaller 
hazard  while  a  positive  coefficient  represents  a  higher  hazard  of  promotion.  Table  6 
presents the results for three different specifications: exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz.  
From Table 6, we conclude for the inappropriateness of the exponential model after 
performing  a  test  (t-statistic=69.64,  p-value=0)  on  the  hypothesis  that  the  ancillary 
parameter  (the  shape  parameter)  in  the  Weibull  model  is  equal  to  1.  Additionally,  the 
Weibull model performs better than Gompertz since the former shows both a higher log-
likelihood and a smaller AIC value. 
AFT metrics comparison is made in Table 7. In these models, positive coefficients 
reveal higher survival times or, which is the same, longer time elapsed until a promotion. 
On the other hand, negative coefficients mean shorter survival times. Additionally, an AFT 
regression coefficient relates proportionate changes in survival time to a unit change in a 










                                                 
10 We have also estimated a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model. No significant differences in 
the coefficients were encountered.  
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Table 6: Proportional hazard models’ coefficients: first promotion 






Age group at hire       






























Education       










































Hierarchical level at hire       


























































Log-likelihood  -188,523.53  -186,342.78  -188,387 
AIC   377,151.1  372,791.6  376,880 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All 
coefficients are statistically significant. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information 
criterion.  All  models  include  Industry,  Region  and  Year  dummies.  Number  of  observations:  422,738 
observations. Number of failures: 64,239. Promotion events other than the first are not considered in this 
estimation.  
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Table 7: Accelerate Failure Time models’ estimates: first promotion 









Age group at hire         
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Hierarchical level at hire         
















































































Kappa  --  --  --  .4644 
(.0115) 
Log-likelihood  -186,342.78  -186,064.71  -185,597.68  -185,341.33 
AIC   372,791.6  372,235.4  371,301.4  370,790.7 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All coefficients are statistically 
significant. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. All models include Industry, Region and Year 
dummies. Number of observations: 422,738 observations. Number of failures: 64,239. Promotion events other than the first are not 
considered in this estimation.  
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Relating the Weibull model, that can be specified both in the PH and the AFT metric, 
with other AFT models like the lognormal, the log-logistic or the generalized gamma allows 
for the conclusion that the generalized gamma is the preferred model (showing the highest 
log-likelihood and the smallest AIC values). The generalized gamma is useful for testing 
model specification. Hence, a Wald test on the hypothesis that the shape parameter in the 
generalized gamma model is equal to 1 (or, in other words, a test on the appropriateness of 
the Weibull) is rejected (Chi-squared=2163.12, p-value=0). Also, the lognormal does not 
provide a satisfactory fit to the data since the hypothesis that the shape parameter in the 
generalized gamma model equals zero is rejected. 
Coefficients on the categorical variable of interest Age group at hire, column (4) in Table 
7, show that the time to first promotion increases with age: relative to the 25-34 reference 
age group, the survival times are lengthened by 5.2%, 9.4% and 18.6%, respectively, for the 
age groups 35-44, 45-54 and 55-75. Therefore, younger employees are promoted at a faster 
pace than less younger ones. 
Another conclusion taken is that, compared to men, the time to first promotion is 
shortened  by  almost  5%  for  women.  Also,  the  time  to  first  promotion  is  reduced 
monotonically with the educational level: higher levels of education are associated with 
shorter survival times. McCue (1996) also reports a positive impact of education on the 
promotion hazard, but for all promotions not just the first one. 
Results suggest that entering the firm at low levels of the hierarchy provides more 
opportunities  for  promotion  which  is  consistent  with  the  existence  of  internal  labor 
markets (Baker et al, 1994a). 
Finally,  the  firm  size  elasticity  highlights  the  positive  impact  of  the  size  on  the 
promotion prospects: a 1% increase in firm size shortens by around 0.2% the survival time. 
Similar findings are presented by Pergamit and Veum (1999) and Francesconi (2001). 
To  account  for  unobserved  heterogeneity,  we  also  attempted  to  estimate  the 
generalized gamma model with gamma or inverse-gaussian distributed frailty. However, 
convergence was not obtained in either case. Therefore, we retried the same procedure 
using the log-logistic model (which is the “second best” specification). The likelihood ratio 
test on the hypothesis that the overdispersion parameter equals zero presents a p-value of 
one. Thus, the frailty effect is not significant. Since the frailty variance is estimated to be 
near zero, the individual hazard function will resemble the population hazard function. In 
this  situation,  as  Gutierrez  (2002)  suggests,  the  heterogeneity  may  be  attributed  to  the 
passage of time. With the passage of time, the impact of the independent variables on the  
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population hazard will diminish in favor of the frailty effect; for instance, gender (or other 
covariate) becomes less significant and the frailty gains relevance in determining the chance 
of promotion. 
 
6.2 All promotions 
As in the previous subsection, for a multiple event framework, we start by comparing 
the PH with the AFT metric to determine the model that best fits the data. Therefore, 
Table  8  shows  the  appropriateness  of  PH  models  while  Table  9  presents  AFT 
specifications. 
New to these tables is the introduction of the variables Previous events, Tenure and Tenure 
squared, compared to the covariates present in Tables 6 and 7. The variable Previous events is 
included to account for event dependence as described in Section 5.3. 
A concern using repeated events is that the hazard rate is expressed as a function of 
time since last event. Sometimes, it may be more adequate to let the hazard vary as a 
function of some common starting point. However, Allison (1984) refers that models for 
multiple events in which the hazard is a function of time since some fixed starting point 
may be inconvenient to estimate. As suggest by the author, to overcome this empirical 
inconvenience, we include in the model Tenure and its squared as independent variables. 
Also, its inclusion in the model intends to capture the influence of specific human capital 
accumulation and learning effects. 
Again, Table 8 indicates that the Weibull is the preferred model in the PH form. Since 
the Weibull satisfies both the PH and the AFT assumptions, Table 9 displays Weibull 
model results in the AFT form together with the other AFT models. This allows for the 
comparison between models and it reveals that the log-logistic specification shows the 
highest log-likelihood and the lowest AIC value. Therefore, the log-logistic model is the 
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Table 8: Proportional hazard models’ coefficients 






Age group at hire       
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Hierarchical level at hire       












































































Log-likelihood  -238,714.73  -220,292.33  -229,505.04 
AIC   477,539.5  440,696.7  459,122.1 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All 
coefficients are statistically significant with the exception of those signalled with †. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. All models include Industry, Region and Year dummies. 
Number of observations: 479,308 observations. Number of failures: 91,214.  
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Table 9: Accelerate Failure Time models’ estimates 









Age group at hire         
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Hierarchical level at hire         








































































































Kappa  --  --  --  .5184 
(.0073) 
Log-likelihood  -220,292.33  -220,046.37  -216,118.36  -217,950.62 
AIC   440,696.7  440,204.7  432,348.7  436,015.2 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All coefficients are statistically 
significant with the exception of those signalled with  †. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. All 
models include Industry, Region and Year dummies. Number of observations: 479,308 observations. Number of failures: 91,214.  
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Relative to younger workers, aged 25 to 34 at hire (the reference group), workers hired 
at older ages face longer times to promotion. In effect, column (3) in Table 9 shows that 
workers aged 35 to 44 at hire experience a 1.7% higher survival time than the reference 
group.  Also,  survival  times  monotonically  increase  with  age  at  hire.  Compared  to 
employees hired at ages 25 to 34, workers in the 45 to 54 age group and those in the 55 to 
75 years cohort at hire present longer times to promotion (3.8% and 10.8%, respectively). 
These results suggest that firms seem to favor younger workers in promotions. Stronger 
effects were obtained when considering the distribution of time to first promotion. This 
preference in promotion opportunities towards younger employees may influence older 
workers’ motivation as well as their employment status. Effectively, evidence shows that 
age discrimination practices at the firm level are consistent with lower wage growth for 
older workers, with early retirement behavior and job separations (Adams, 2002; Johnson 
and Neumark, 1997).  
Considering gender, men are found to have a 2.6% higher survival time than women, 
meaning that women are more likely to receive a promotion than men. Ferreira (2009), 
using the same data set, reports similar results for overall promotions. 
Better educated individuals see their survival times to promotion shortened. This is 
consistent with the returns to education associated with human capital theory. However, if 
education can be considered an indicator of general human capital accumulation, tenure 
may also be regarded as a characteristic of specific human capital accumulation and of 
learning. Results suggest that time to promotion increases with tenure but at a decreasing 
rate. McCue (1996) finds a similar result regarding the effect of tenure on the promotion 
hazard.  
Considering the Hierarchical level at hire, estimates show that compared to employees 
hired as skilled workers, those getting into the firm at lower hierarchical levels (apprentices, 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers) experience shorter times to promotion. Nevertheless, 
although at a higher hierarchical level, highly skilled workers also present a 6.7% smaller 
survival time in comparison with skilled workers at hire. 
The  occurrence  dependence  variable  Previous  events  clearly  suggests  that  past 
promotions are a stronger indicator of subsequent ones. Previous promotions contribute 
to significantly shorten survival times: the receipt of one (previous) promotion reduces by 
54.5% the time to promotion. Thus, previously promoted workers are more likely to be 
promoted once again which is consistent with the promotion fast-tracks documented in 
the literature (Baker et al., 1994a; Pergamit and Veum, 1999).   
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As for firm characteristics, Firm size is negatively associated with survival times, as the 
elasticity of the survival time relative to the number of firm employees presents a negative 
sign. Workers in large firms face shorter periods to promotion than those in small firms. 
Firms with a larger workforce have overall structured hierarchical levels that open to the 
set of an internal labor market. In the existence of an internal labor market, medium to 
high levels of the hierarchy are filled in through promotions from lower levels. This result 
is in agreement with previous empirical findings (Pergamit and Veum, 1999; Francesconi, 
2001).  
Table  10  shows  the  results  for  log-logistic  models  with  frailty  and  shared  frailty. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates for the frailty models with gamma and inverse-
gaussian  distribution  for  the  frailty,  respectively.  Comparing  these  with  the  results 
presented in Table 9 for the log-logistic model no striking differences occur: coefficients 
are very similar in each of the models. Nonetheless, the frailty effect is always statistically 
significant considering the results of the likelihood ratio tests. 
The model that best fits the data is the one with the gamma distributed frailty and it is 
also the preferred model because it has the lowest AIC value. This is the reason why in the 
shared-frailty models we use the gamma distribution for the frailty. 
In a shared-frailty model, the frailty is specific to a particular group. Columns (3), (4) 
and (5) in Table 10 present the estimates for models where the frailty is shared by the 
match worker/firm, by the worker and by the firm, respectively. The results of columns (3) 
and (4) do not differ substantially and both are similar to the results obtained for a non-
frailty  specification.  The  major  difference  occurs  when  allowing  for  correlation  within 
firms. In effect, considering the overall specifications, the one that uses a frailty shared at 
the firm level is the one producing the best fit (it presents the largest log-likelihood and the 
smallest AIC value). 
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Table 10: Estimates from the log-logistic models with frailty 
Frailty  Shared-frailty (Gamma) 
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Hierarchical level at hire           












































































































































Log-likelihood  -216,037.94  -216,054.8  -215,849  -215,819.67  -175,232.38 
AIC  432,189.9  432,223.6  431,812  431,753.3  350,578.8 
Number of groups  --  --  422,738  402,463  44,728 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Notes: Reference groups: [25-35) for the Age group at hire; female; 4 years of Education and skilled workers. All coefficients are statistically significant with the exception 
of those signalled with †. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. AIC: Akaike information criterion. All models include Industry, Region and Year dummies. Number 
of observations: 479,308 observations. Number of failures: 91,214.  
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Figure 4 shows the estimated individual and population hazard functions for the three 
different levels of frailty. 
 
Figure 4: Estimated individual and population hazard functions 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
Note: ‘Time to event’ measures the time to promotion, in months. 
 
When the frailty is significant, the population hazard will tend to begin falling past a 
certain time, independently of the shape of the individual hazard. This is explained by the 
frailty effect: with the passage of time, the frailer individuals will fail and only the less frail 
will remain in the population hence generating a more homogeneous population. This is 
reflected in Figure 4. 
The  stronger  firm  frailty  effect  shows  that  firms’  unobservable  characteristics  are 
relevant  in  the  determination  of  the  promotion  process.  Controlling  for  firms’ 
unobservable heterogeneity, the magnitude of the impact of the Age group at hire on the time 
to promotion is even stronger. Within firms, compared to workers hired with 25 to 34 
years  old,  when  workers  are  hired  above  the  age  34 threshold  they  find  their  time  to 
promotion lengthened and this length is amplified with age: workers aged 35 to 44 at hire 
experience a 2.3% higher survival time than the reference group, with times to promotion 
enhanced to 5.2% and 13.6%, respectively, for workers aged 45 to 54 and older than 55.  
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Overall results
11 suggest that older individuals have less promotion opportunities than 
younger workers, controlling for firm, worker or match effects. 
 
7  Conclusion 
Using a sample of new firms and their workers, this research shows that age harms 
workers’ promotion opportunities. Duration models’ results suggest that older individuals 
experience  longer  survival  times  to  promotion  than  their  younger  counterparts.  The 
magnitude of this effect is even stronger when considering just the time to first promotion. 
Older employees are left for last in promotion. 
Facing uneven promotion prospects, older employees may face discouragement in the 
workplace, less appreciation and become more attracted by early retirement schemes. 
These results seem to demonstrate that active aging policies should be more focused at 
endorsing labor market opportunities for older workers. If the aim is to delay the exit from 
the labor force, in order to raise the employment rate of older workers, then attention 
must be given to the improvement of older individuals’ chances in all employment related 
dimensions. 
Left  for  future  research  is  the  analysis  on  how  the  employment  history  of  older 
individuals influences their future career development. That is, knowing if older workers 
entering  new  firms  are  “job  changers”  or  individuals  that  come  from  a  spell  of  non-
employment should have an impact on their promotion prospects. Moreover, the study of 
how  uneven  promotion  opportunities  influence  the  labor  market  outcomes  of  older 
workers, with particular interest on the exit decision, remains a topic for future research. 
This can be tested within a competing risks framework in which retirement is one of the 
alternative paths. Knowing the factors that influence the decision of leaving the labor force 
is crucial for the development of policy measures that aim at postponing the exit from the 
labor market. 
                                                 
11 We have also estimated the models for a sample of workers aged 15 to 65, since 65 is the legal retirement 
age in Portugal. Nevertheless, results remain the same: older workers experience greater times to promotion 
than younger workers do.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A   Construction of the sample 
 
To get the sample used in the study we started by creating a panel of firms merging the 
cross-sectional 1986 to 2005 files available on Quadros de Pessoal. The aim was to obtain a 
panel including just new firms. Thus, the variable Year of Creation available on each cross-
sectional file for firms is crucial. 
From  the  above  panel  we  started  by  eliminating  the  firms  reporting  two  or  more 
different years of creation (4% of the observations dropped), to avoid misinterpretations. 
After identifying the year in which the firm firstly appears in the dataset and signalling the 
moment  when  the  firm  is  created,  we  kept  the  firms  for  which  the  year  of  creation 
coincides with the first year of appearance in the dataset (Panel A). 
Next, we turned our attention to the workers’ panel. In situations where there existed 
more than one observation for worker/year we kept just the observation related to the 
main  job  (the  one  with  higher  reported  hours  of  work).  Workers  with  30
12  or  less 
hours/week of work were removed from the sample. This was done in order to assure 
some attachment to the labor market. Also we kept just employees aged 15 to 75
13. A 
relevant variable in this panel is the Date of Admission at the Firm since it is used to create the 
Promotion indicator as well as the Tenure variable. Therefore, we checked for inconsistencies 
in the variable such as: Date of Admission higher than the year of the survey. Also, if the 
reported Date of Admission for the pair worker/firm was always the same, missing values on 
Date of Admission for that pair were replaced by the reported non-missing value. We have 
also replaced inconsistencies (like decreasing Date of Admission over time) with the value 
reported more than half of the times. The remaining inconsistencies and missing values on 
this variable were dropped (Panel B). 
Afterwards, sorted by firm and year, we merged Panel A with Panel B obtaining a panel 
of new firms and their workers. Firms that did not present information on workers from 
the year of creation and firms that had workers hired (Date of Admission) before the year of 
creation  were  excluded.  Finally,  we  have  included  firms  with  more  than  two  years  of 
                                                 
12 In Van Bastelaer et al. (1997) a definition of part-time work is presented for international comparison. In 
some countries, like the United States, 35 hours of work a week is the normal threshold for a worker to be 
classified as a part-timer. That is the benchmark in the papers by Blank (1988) and Hirsch (2005). In other 
countries, like the United Kingdom, working 30 or fewer hours per week is the boundary in the definition of 
part-time employment. I consider this 30 hours threshold to define part-time employment in Portugal. 
13 For comparison, in the empirical analysis we have also used a subsample of workers aged 15 to 65.  
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survival  in  the  market.  The  above  exclusions  resulted  in  a  sample  with  1,033,767 
observations, for 416,170 workers, 44, 920 firms and 437,498 spells firm/worker. 
 
Appendix B  Tables 
 
Table B1: Distribution of firms’ survival times 
Number of years of survival  Frequency  Percent 
3  9,407  20.94 
4  9,685  21.56 
5  2,285  5.09 
6  5,231  11.64 
7  3,941  8.77 
8  3,530  7.86 
9  2,862  6.37 
10  2,245  5.00 
>10  5,734  12.77 
Total  44,920  100 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
 
Table B2: Distribution of promotions 
Number of promotions  Frequency  Percent 
0  352,473  84.69 
1  46,158  11.09 
2  11,817  2.84 
3  3,619  .87 
4  1,255  .30 
5  470  .11 
6  204  .05 
7  85  .02 
8  36  .01 
9  32  .01 
10  7  .00 
11  6  .00 
12  3  .00 
13  2  .00 
14  1  .00 
15  2  .00 
Total  416,170  100 
Source: Computations from the authors based on Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2005. 
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